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The African Elephant, Africa, and CITES:
The Next Step
BILL PADGETT*
Conservation is a state of harmony between men and land.'
I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, international trade in wildlife and endangered species has
been an extremely lucrative business. Millions of animals suffer and die
each year at the hands of man, often because of human greed, ignorance,
and vanity. The World Wildlife Fund has estimated world trade in animals
and their products to have a value of $5 billion.2  This expansive
international market for animals led to drastic declines in the populations of
many species, including such exotic animals as the rhino, leopard, tiger, and
African elephant. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) protects wildlife from the
exploitation often found in the international wildlife trade. Drafted in 1973,
CITES came into force in 1975 with ten Member States, 3 and now has 115
Members.
4
As demand, prices, and illegal poaching continued to rise, the Members
of CITES moved the African elephant to appendix I of CITES in October
1989, in an effort to diminish an ivory trade blamed for taking elephant
populations to dangerously low levels.5 This action gave the African
elephant the most protected status under CITES and effectively banned all
commercial trade in the species. The action was vociferously opposed,
especially by southern African countries, which had actually experienced
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington; A.B., 1992, Wabash
College.
1. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 207 (1949).
2. DAVID S. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES: A GUIDE TO CITES
at xviii (1989).
3. Id. at xvii.
4. A Look at CITES, CBSG NEWS, May 1993, at 22.
5. Dennis McAuliffe, Jr., UN. Conference Bars Ivory Imports, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1989, at
A13. See infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text for discussion of appendix I of CITES.
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elephant population increases in recent years.6 These opponents of the
appendix I listing (and the ivory ban that came with the listing) claimed that
their conservation systems, which included strict enforcement regimes. to
protect against poaching, allowed for both adequate population levels of
elephants and a controlled ivory trade. Nevertheless, the listing and ban
took effect in January 1990.'
Today, elephant populations have substantially increased in most
countries and illegal international trade in elephant ivory has decreased to
minimal levels. While western conservationists and eastern African
countries claim that the ivory ban should remain, the southern African
countries argue that the ban should be lifted so that locals would have an
economic "stake" and, thus, an incentive to conserve elephant populations.
This Note espouses the position of the southern African countries, and
proposes a solution to this conflict-a strictly controlled ivory trade based
on a CITES-supervised "Ivory Exchange."
Part II of this Note discusses the general structure of CITES and the
manner in which its listing and regulatory scheme govern the international
wildlife trade. Part III summarizes failed efforts to control the ivory trade
that decimated African elephant populations in eastern Africa before CITES
Members placed the elephant on appendix I. Part IV discusses how
uncontrolled elephant population growth causes conflicts with Africa's
exploding human population while damaging Africa's diverse ecosystems.
Part IV then compares the ivory trade prohibition stance of eastern African
countries to the controlled ivory trade and sustainable management position
of the southern African countries, concluding that a sustainable management
system that gives Africa's people a stake in conservation is a better route for
both Africa's people and its elephants. Part V proposes a plan, a CITES-
based "Ivory Exchange," that will allow for a strictly controlled ivory trade
while ensuring sustainable African elephant populations.
6. See McAuliffe, supra note 5, at A13 (noting the immediate criticism of the ban by five
southern African countries). For example, Zimbabwe has been very critical of the ban, especially in light
of the fact that its elephant population increased from 32,000 to 52,000 in the twenty years prior to the
ban. See Edward Ricciuti, The Elephant Wars, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 16.
7. Ricciuti, supra note 6, at 16, 18, 30.
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II. CITES-How DOES IT WORK?
A. "Trade" in "Specimens"
CITES regulates the trade of species listed in its three appendices.
Under CITES, "trade" is any export, import, or re-export of a specimen.'
"Trade" encompasses a broad geographical meaning, including any situation
in which a specimen crosses international borders; it is not necessarily
limited to the movement of goods for profit.9 Re-export simply means the
export of any specimen that has previously been imported.' ° "Specimen"
is defined as any animal, whether dead or alive, or any "readily recognizable
part or derivative thereof."" Thus, a specimen may be a live elephant en
route to a zoo in a foreign country, or an ivory tusk pulled from an elephant
killed illegally by poachers.
B. CITES' Focus and Functioning
The focus of CITES is not on the protection of habitat or wildlife
management, but rather on specific threats to species, such as destruction
and removal of individual animals and plants from their natural habitat for
commerce, entertainment, sport, or other human interest. 2 Thus, unlike the
Endangered Species Act in the United States, which provides for extensive
protection of an endangered species' habitat, 3 CITES concentrates
exclusively on protecting individual animals, not their surroundings. This
focus on individual animals crossing geographical borders is grounded in a
reliance upon customs officers across the world who make border checks for
illegal transport of wildlife products across international borders.'4
8. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar.
3, 1973, art. l(c), T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1091, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, 245 [hereinafter CITES].
9. FAVRE, supra note 2, at 25.
10. CITES, supra note 8, art. (d), T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1090-91, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
11. Id. art. I(b), T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1090, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245. The present lack of a
workable definition for "readily recognizable part or derivative thereof" has been especially problematic
in giving guidance toward discerning illegal trade from legal trade. See FAVRE, supra note 2, at 19.
12. FAVRE, supra note 2, at 30.
13. See Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1988) ("critical habitat" and
its protection are to be taken into account and designated when determining the extent of protection for
an endangered or threatened species).
14. A Look At CITES, supra note 4, at 22-23.
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The basic treaty is composed of twenty-five articles. Member States
meet biennially for conferences (each is officially referred to as a
Conference of the Parties to the Convention) to review the effectiveness of
the Convention, and, most importantly, to discuss changes to the lists of
protected species on its three appendices, which mandate the level of
protection each listed species is to receive.1
5
Enforcement is the responsibility of Member States, who are to integrate
CITES' mandates into their own domestic laws. Thus, to a great extent, the
success of the treaty depends on the adequacy of domestic legislative
enactments and the extent of enforcement in individual States. 16 In the
United States, for example, the Endangered Species Act provides for
Convention implementation.' 7 Members are to establish management and
scientific authorities; the former is responsible for granting and denying
CITES export and import permits, and the latter is responsible for evaluating
the possible effects of granting such permits."' In the United States, the
Department of Interior enforces CITES through the Fish and Wildlife
Service. The Wildlife Permit Office and the Office of Scientific Authority
are the respective management and scientific authorities of the Fish and
Wildlife Service.' 9
Member States can require even stricter controls than the controls listed
in CITES.2° In 1989, the United States and numerous countries in the
European Community banned imports of ivory products. This ban took
effect before CITES Member States voted later that year to move the
African elephant to appendix I, effectively banning the ivory trade
worldwide. 2' Regardless, CITES requires Member States to submit reports
to the CITES Secretariat in Switzerland (the administrative branch of the
15. Id. at 22.
16. Karl Jonathan Liwo, Note, The Continuing Significance of CITES During the 1990s, 15
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 122, 129 (1991).
17. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 8, 16 U.S.C. § 1537(a) (1988) (implementation);
Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(c) (1988) (unlawful for any person subject to
U.S. jurisdiction to engage in trade contrary to the provisions of the Convention).
18. CITES, supra note 8, art. IX, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1103, 993 U.N.T.S. at 251; A Look at
CITES, supra note 4, at 22-23; see also FAVRE, supra note 2, at 245-48. For example, scientific
authorities decide whether granting a permit will be detrimental to a species.
19. Meena Alagappan, The United States' Enforcement of CITES, 10 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
541, 550 (1990).
20. See A Look at CITES, supra note 4, at 22.
21. Randy Simmons & Urs Kreuter, Save the Elephant-Buy Ivory, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1989,
at D3.
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Convention) detailing trade records, along with legislative, regulatory, and
administrative measures.22  Unfortunately, many Member States are
notorious for failing to report, or for providing only partial trade records.23
C. Appendices Listing and Regulation
Appendix I lists those species that are most endangered. To be listed
on appendix I, a species must be threatened with extinction and affected, or
potentially affected, by international trade.2 ' The Convention makes
determinations based on regional population studies; to be placed on
appendix I, a species need not be threatened with global elimination. 25 To
trade in an appendix I species, both export and import permits are
required. 26  Requiring both types of documentation serves as a double
check on illegal trade in appendix I species. Permits for trade in these
species must meet certain conditions beyond the export and import
requirements: it must be shown that any action will not be "detrimental to
the survival of the species," and that any specimen was not obtained
illegally in the country of export.27 Most importantly, commercial trade in
appendix I species is prohibited. 2' Thus, when the Convention Members
voted to move the African elephant to appendix I, they banned trade in
ivory between Member States.
Appendix II lists species that are not necessarily presently threatened
with extinction, but which may become so unless trade is subject to strict
regulation.29 With such a listing, CITES seeks to assure a species a viable
role in local ecosystems by keeping populations throughout the species'
range at levels consistent with that role, while still allowing some strictly
regulated international commercial trade in that species.3" Regulation of
22. CITES, supra note 8, art. VIII(7), T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1101, 993 U.N.T.S. at 249-50.
23. FAVRE, supra note 2, at 237.
24. CITES, supra note 8, art. II(1), T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
25. FAVRE, supra note 2, at 32.
26. CITES, supra note 8, art. III, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1093-95, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246-47.
Comparable documentation is even required for trade with non-parties in specimens on any of the
appendices.
27. Id. art. 111(2-3), T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1093-94, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246.
28. Id. art. III(3)(c), T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1094,993 U.N.T.S. at 246 (import permit allowed only
if a management authority of the state of import is satisfied that the specimen is not to be used for
primarily commercial purposes).
29. Id. art. 1I(2)(a), T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
30. FAVRE, supra note 2, at 41.
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appendix II species requires export permits only, but CITES establishes an
affirmative duty on Member States' scientific authorities to monitor
population levels and exports of species listed on appendix II. Thus, in
terms of trade, CITES will only apply to an appendix II species when one
attempts to export that species. With an appendix II listing (and the related
regulations), CITES seeks to keep that species' population well above
appendix I levels.32
At the fifth meeting of the Conference of the Parties in 1985, Member
States passed a resolution that allows the "downlisting" of an appendix I
species to appendix II. The resolution requires that Parties set export
quotas, with each Party setting its quota at a level that will not harm the
survival of the species.3 This requires a country to engage in a more
intensive and comprehensive management program than otherwise would
exist under a "normal" appendix II listing.34 Thus, an appendix II "plus"
system was established.
Member States established a similar quota system for the African
elephant at this same Conference-the Ivory Export Quota System
(IEQS) 5 The IEQS was totally voluntary and had no binding effect on
the parties.36 While that system failed miserably to protect the elephant
effectively,3" under CITES a modified version of this downlisting is
presently possible for the elephant, along with the initiation of a centralized,
strictly controlled ivory trade exchange.
Finally, for appendix III listings, CITES provides for unilateral listing
of a species native to a country, with no vote required from Member
31. CITES, supra note 8, art. IV(2-3), T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1095-96, 993 U.N.T.S. at 247.
32. Id. art. IV(3), T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1096, 993 U.N.T.S. at 247.
33. FAVRE, supra note 2, at 51.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 127.
36. Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the Elephant?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 21
(1990). Thus, Party States often exceeded their quotas or even declined to submit quotas to the CITES
Secretariat, especially since other CITES parties had no legal basis under CITES for denying entry of
elephant products. Id.
37. See id.
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States.38 Export permits are required, but are far less burdensome to
acquire than those under appendix II.
39
D. Problematic Provisions and Concerns
Regardless of a species' change of listing on CITES' appendices, article
XXIII of the Convention allows a country to declare itself immune from the
binding effects of a change in the listing of a species by taking a
"reservation." Countries taking such reservations almost always have a
significant economic interest in the trade of the species at issue, and usually
take reservations when a species is moved to appendix 1.40 This is due, of
course, to the fact that such a move bans commercial trade in that species.
Once a country takes a reservation on a species, it can then trade with non-
Member States and other Members who have taken the same reservation."
For example, five African countries (Botswana, Burundi, Malawi,
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe) immediately took reservations on the elephant
when it was moved to appendix I in 1989.42 These countries soon
grudgingly withdrew their reservations, however, and chose to abide by the
ban on imports mandated by the listing. This was primarily due to outside
international pressure and the corresponding decline in ivory demand and
prices.43 Other species are not so lucky, however, as some countries with
economic interests in newly listed appendix I species routinely take long-
term reservations."
The reservation provision severely undercuts the effectiveness of the
Convention, especially where countries taking reservations have sizable
proportions of the world's population in a particular species. Reservations
allow these countries to comply with CITES only when it suits their needs,
38. See CITES, supra note 8, art. 111(3), T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1093-94, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246
(appendix III shall include all species which any Party identifies as subject to regulation within its
jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation, and as needing the cooperation of
other Parties in the control of trade).
39. FAVRE, supra note 2, at 141.
40. See Gary D. Meyers & Kyla S. Bennett, Answering "The Call of the Wild": An Examination
of U.S. Participation in International Wildlife Law, 7 PACE ENVT'L L. REV. 75, 104 (1989).
41. See CITES, supra note 8, art. XXIII, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1116, 993 U.N.T.S. at 257.
42. McAuliffe, supra note 5, at A13.
43. See generally Brian Child, A Perspective from Zimbabwe: The Elephant as a Natural
Resource, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 60.
44. See Meyers & Bennett, supra note 40, at 104 (Japan has repeatedly entered reservations for
whales listed on appendix 1).
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and to legally exempt themselves when the economic incentive is present.45
Countries taking reservations are not only exempt from the permitting
system of CITES, but also have no obligation to provide the Secretariat with
data on trade in species on which they have taken reservations because they
are deemed to be non-Members with respect to those species.46  The
reservation provision is, however, a safeguard provision of compromise that
serves to keep Members (who otherwise would not have entered into the
treaty) ii the Convention. Unfortunately, such exemption provisions are
essentially a fact of life for many international treaties concerned with the
conservation of wildlife.47
Other problems with CITES are the "personal and household effects"
exemption48 and the lack of a workable definition for "readily recognizable
part or derivative" of an animal. 49 The fact that the phrase "personal and
household effects" is not defined in CITES has permitted some countries to
be quite liberal in their interpretations, while others strictly construe the
phrase." In any case, CITES' failure to define "personal and household
effects" results in inconsistent enforcement. In a related way, because the
language "readily recognizable part or derivative" has not been clearly
defined, CITES has been construed as governing only raw ivory, not worked
ivory." This lack of clarity has been used to the benefit of ivory-
producing countries and, especially, intermediary trading countries, where
ivory is quickly and superficially carved to circumvent the constraints of
CITES regulations.52
Finally, domestic enforcement of CITES regulations is sometimes
woefully inadequate. For example, in the late 1970s, TRAFFIC, a program
of the World Wildlife Fund that monitors international trade in animals and
45. Id.
46. SIMON LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 263 (1985). Although the Fourth
Conference of the Parties to the Convention recommended that parties with reservations treat the species
as if there were no reservation for the purposes of supplying population data, it is not known how well
Member States have responded to this request. See FAVRE, supra note 2, at 324.
47. See LYSTER, supra note 46, at 262. In article 5(3) of the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling, for example, a Member State may take an "objection" (nearly identical to a
reservation under CITES) within 90 days of the notification of the listing of a species on its "Schedule"
(list) of protected species. Id. at 27.
48. CITES, supra note 8, art. VII(3), T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1099-1100, 993 U.N.T.S. at 249.
49. See CITES, supra note 8, art. 1(b)(ii), T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1090-91, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
50. LYSTER, supra note 46, at 258. See also FAVRE, supra note 2, at 180.
51. Glennon, supra note 36, at 12.
52. Id. at 22.
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plants, conducted an experiment in an effort to assess the expertise of
customs officials in CITES nations:
TRAFFIC officials declared or displayed a cactus to customs
officials in several countries, including the United Kingdom, the
Soviet Union, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and the
United States. Despite the fact that virtually all cacti are protected
in some fashion under CITES, no questions were asked by officials
in any of these countries about the species of the plant or its
origins.53
The exceptions to this were in the United States and Soviet Union, where
confiscation either occurred or was threatened; however, the rationale was
not related to possible CITES violations, but rather to health regulations.54
III. THE FAILED BATTLE AGAINST IVORY TRADE: PRE-APPENDIX I
A. The 1980s: A Decade of Massacre in the East, Successful
Management in the South
In the decade prior to its appendix I listing, the African elephant
population declined at an alarming rate, mostly at the hands of poachers.
Between 1979 and 1989, the number of elephants Africa-wide was cut in
half, to no more than 600,000 animals. 5 Some countries' populations
were especially devastated by poachers-in Kenya, from 1973 to 1989, the
elephant population plunged from 167,000 to 16,000.56 Some sources went
as far as to suggest in 1989 that the elephant would be extinct by 2000.' 7
There were numerous factors contributing to this decline: increased poaching
for ivory; encroachment of human development, which led to losses of the
elephant's habitat (and a resulting constriction of its range in most
53. John B. Heppes & Eric J. McFadden, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora: Improving the Prospects for Preserving Our Biological Heritage, 5
B.U. INTr'L L.J. 229, 239 (1987).
54. Id.
55. Ricciuti, supra note 6, at 16.
56. Id.
57. Alagappan, supra note 19, at 543.
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countries); persistent licensed hunting; and the effect of tourism on elephant
behavior patterns.5
Of the various factors leading to the decline of elephant populations,
poaching for ivory was far and away the predominant problem.59 The
1980s saw astounding decreases in African elephant populations, as the
ivory market, with drastic increases in demand and prices, flourished. The
United States and Japan were the greatest final importers,' as an inverse
ratio developed between elephant populations and ivory prices.
Just as alarming as the drops in elephant numbers were the methods by
which poachers killed. Automatic weapons and rocket-fired grenades were
common "tools" used in the poaching trade.6 Some primitive poachers
used methods as crude and cruel as killing elephants with spears, after
slowing them by slashing their hamstring muscles.62 Also alarming is the
evidence that the illegal ivory trade helped to fund guerrilla movements in
the various African civil wars of the 1980s.63
Some countries fared better than others in battling poachers. Kenya's
failure to combat poachers effectively during the 1980s led to its decimated
elephant populations. At one point, Kenyans, overwhelmed by poacher
firepower, requested helicopter gunships, spotter planes, transporters, and
automatic weapons from Great Britain for new, paramilitary anti-poaching
units.' Prior to 1989, however, the anti-poaching forces of Kenya and its
east African neighbors were either simply inept in their efforts or corrupt in
the face of the lucrative ivory trade to prevent poaching. 5 As Kenya
became increasingly serious in its anti-poaching efforts, it was readily
apparent that the concurrent decline in poaching was not related solely to the
drop in demand for ivory brought on by the ivory ban, but rather was
58. Glennon, supra note 36, at 2-4; see generally Ricciuti, supra note 6, at 16.
59. Glennon, supra note 36, at 3.
60. Id. at 20.
61. Id. at 4 n.37. Mortar shells became a common sight next to the carcasses of elephants with
their tusks ripped out. See lAIN & ORIA DOUGLAS-HAMILTON, BATTLE FOR THE ELEPHANTS 224 (Brain
Jackman ed., 1992).
62. Marilyn Achiron & Roy Wilkinson, Africa: The Last Safari?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 18, 1986,
at 40, 40-42.
63. Glennon, supra note 36, at 19.
64. Eric Ransdell, Heavy Artillery for Horns of Plenty, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 20,
1989, at 61, 64.
65. See Saving the Elephant: Nature's Great Masterpiece, THE ECONOMIST, July 1, 1989, at
15, 16.
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equally the result of Kenya's tougher attitude regarding poaching.66 This
new get-tough policy has helped Kenya's elephant populations to rebound,
with an increase of over 10,000 animals since 1989.67
Southern African countries have a history of aggressive anti-poaching
policies, along with effective management policies that closely monitor the
balance of populations in various areas to protect against overcrowding.
Zimbabwe, for example, has taken a hard line against poaching for
decades.68 Elephant populations there have increased from 32,000 in 1960
to 52,000 in 1989 to over 70,000 as of mid-1993.69 This aggressive anti-
poaching enforcement policy has not stopped with the advent of the ivory
ban and the resulting decline in demand for ivory.7"
B. Why Poaching and the Illegal Ivory Trade Flourished Under CITES
Poaching and the illegal ivory trade flourished under CITES for a
number of reasons. One difficulty encountered while the African elephant
was listed on appendix II was that of discerning legal ivory from illegal
ivory in granting permits. As demand for and trade in ivory increased, ivory
"laundering" States, or entreptits, became important figures in enhancing the
marketability of illegal ivory. These entrepdts were (and, to a lesser extent,
still are) essentially way stations where ivory was worked and its origin
easily concealed before it was sent to final ports71 ; thus, the illegally
procured raw ivory, was "laundered" as it became a piece of worked ivory,
and therefore was no longer subject to CITES. One of the most prolific of
these entrep6ts during the 1980s was Burundi (also one of the smallest
countries in Africa). It was an exit point for many tons of ivory, often in
blatant disregard of CITES mandates.72 Burundi routinely and blatantly
lied about the origin of its ivory to hide the fact that it had illegally received
raw ivory. For example, for many years Burundi had only one elephant; in
66. See When is Culling the Animal not Killing the Animal?, AFRICA REP., May/June 1992, at
10 (citing a World Wide Fund for Nature study of six African countries, including Kenya, attributing the
decrease in poaching to tougher policies implemented by local authorities).
67. Ricciuti, supra note 6, at 16. With a policy against poachers of "shoot to kill," one four-
month offensive by Kenyan anti-poaching units led to the deaths of 30 poachers. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See generally Ivory Dealer Killed in Zimbabwe, TRAFFIC BULL., July/Aug. 1993, at 9.
71. Glennon, supra note 36, at 19.
72. FAVRE, supra note 2, at 136.
1995] 539
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
1986, this single animal somehow managed to produce 23,000 tusks, all
carefully documented as originating in that country."
In addition, ivory-producing countries set their "sustainable yield" of
elephant quotas at ridiculously high levels under the pre-appendix I Ivory
Export Quota System.7' The requirements of the IEQS simply became
procedures for these States to notify CITES of the number of tusks they
planned to export; quotas often far exceeded what many conservationists
considered sustainable yields.75 Further, even if a country was serious
about its quotas, it often was not as serious about preventing poaching;
underfunded and underequipped enforcement officers were often outgunned
by poachers.76
C. The Elephant Reaches Appendix I
As the fate of the elephant grew bleaker, especially in east African
countries, there was an imminent need for some type of drastic action.
Kenya and its neighbors began calling for an ivory ban in the late 1980s,
and actively recruited western support for this position.77 July 18, 1989,
saw the pinnacle of these efforts to gain public backing for an ivory ban.
Kenya's President, H.E. Daniel Arap Moi, set ablaze a stockpile of several
thousand tusks valued at approximately $3 million.7" After several
individual countries (including the United States) banned ivory imports, the
ivory bonfire was an essential part of the final push that led to the appendix
I listing at the end of that year. The ivory ban cause became so popular that
the demand and price of ivory dropped dramatically even before the
Convention voted to move the African elephant to appendix I.7 9 Because
of the ban and more aggressive anti-poaching forces, ivory prices
plummeted from $140 per pound in April 1989, to less than $5 per pound
73. Saving the Elephant, supra note 65, at 17.
74. Glennon, supra note 36, at 21; see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
75. Id. In 1986 CITES authorized the export of over 108,000 tusks representing over 50,000
elephants-ten times what some conservationists regarded as Africa's sustainable yield. Saving the
Elephant, supra note 65, at 16.
76. Glennon, supra note 36, at 21.
77. Ricciuti, supra note 6, at 18.
78. Richard Leakey, A Perspective From Kenya: Elephants Today and Tomorrow, WILDLIFE
CONSERVATION, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 58.
79. The Price of a Tusker, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 1989, at 19-20.
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in April 1990.80 Poaching similarly decreased, as the number of illegally
killed elephants fell dramatically: from hundreds per year in the 1980s, to
thirty-six in 1990, and to seventeen in 1991.81
Many economists predicted that the ban would have little effect on the
ivory trade; some even predicted that the ban would have a detrimental
effect on the elephant, as demand would turn even more to the black market,
which already made up three-quarters of the trade.82 This obviously has
not been the case in the few years since the ivory ban took effect. Demand
was quashed to a large extent not just by the ban on the ivory trade, but by
a sense of moral outrage in many countries brought about by massive global
publicity. It has been estimated that more than 850 million people saw
news of Kenya's ivory bonfire on television or in magazines and
newspapers. 83  For western governments, it became a political issue.8
Momentum quickly developed against the use of ivory, and the western
consensus against the trade gave the east Africans' cry for an ivory ban a
sense of "global legitimacy." As the elephant populations recover, however,
this global fervor against ivory may wane. And, as the same economists
who warned against the ban have noted, the decline of the ivory trade may
just be a short-run result-as Africans and the elephants continue to compete
for arable land. In the long run, Africans may see less and less reason for
effective conservation.85 While the ivory controversy may have killed
demand in the United States and Europe (these countries grew to consider
ivory socially unacceptable), some economists predict that new demand may
develop in countries less enthusiastic about conservation, such as various
industrialized countries in Asia, where ivory consumption was increasing
prior to the ban.86
80. Leakey, supra note 78, at 59.
81. Id.
82. The Price of a Tusker, supra note 79, at 20.
83. Leakey, supra note 78, at 58.
84. Id.
85. See generally The Price of a Tusker, supra note 79.
86. See EDWARD BARBIER ET AL., ELEPHANTS, ECONOMICS AND IVORY 8-10 (1990); The Ivory
Paradox: Killing the Trade in Tusks Could Wipe Out the Elephant, Too, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 1991,
at 16.
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IV. TODAY'S DILEMMA: EAST VERSUS SOUTH;
PROHIBITION VERSUS CONTROLLED TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE
MANAGEMENT
A. Too Many Elephants?
Conflicts between humans and elephants in Africa are reaching new
heights-not because of ivory, but rather because of the increase in elephant
numbers across the continent. As human development encroaches upon
elephant habitat, and as Africa becomes increasingly agricultural, the
elephant's habitat and range greatly decreases in size.87 As Africa's human
population continues to explode,88 farmers' competition with the elephant
intensifies. The elephant's combination of incredible size and intelligence
makes this animal especially troublesome to farmers attempting to protect
their crops.89 Elephants and humans come in contact more often as both
populations increase, sometimes with fatal results. Kenyan newspapers
document the fact that some farmers are afraid to harvest their crops because
of the threat of elephants.9° In fact, from 1982 to 1989, elephants killed
500 Zimbabweans. 91
Therefore, many Africans have a view of elephants that is fundamentally
different (often negative) from that of the rest of the world. The social
behavior and human-like characteristics of elephants elicit high levels of
empathy in westerners.92 In contrast, one Kenyan Masai tribesman, who
was forced to abandon his people's traditional nomadic ways in favor of
farming outside Amboseli National Park, when asked what to do about the
problems caused by the elephants, replied, "Kill them."'93 Many Africans
see elephants as dangerous competitors who drink water supplies, destroy
87. Glennon, supra note 36, at 2.
88. See Ricciuti, supra note 6, at 18 (noting that Kenya's population is growing twice as fast
as that of other developing nations).
89. Id. at 19 (noting that if elephants were not so smart, they would be easier to keep out of
farmlands, and that as a result of their size, the damage that the elephants do to crops is devastating to
many African farmers).
90. Id. at 18.
91. Id.
92. Elephants live in close-knit families, communicate with each other with low-frequency calls
that carry for miles, and seem to exhibit affection and comfort by touching each other in various ways.
See Glennon, supra note 36, at 1-2. Further, elephants seem to experience distress when other elephants
die and have been seen touching, even fondling, the remains. Ricciuti, supra note 6, at 28.
93. Id. at 16.
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trees, and trample crops.94 Some critics of the prohibition of trade in
elephant products, particularly in ivory, warn that as conflicts between
Africans and elephants increase, Africans may begin to see less sense in
taking a "hands off" attitude while losing out in the profits that a controlled
ivory trade might bring to local people.95 Without a stake in conserving
the elephant, initiative to conserve it within the general populace may die
out in some African countries. In the long run, the ivory ban may be the
downfall of the elephant.
The increase in elephant numbers has stressed not only native-elephant
relations; it has stressed Africa's ecosystems as well. When their numbers
are at healthy levels, elephants play an important role in maintaining a
mosaic of habitats in forests, woodlands, and savannas; where they exist in
high densities, they can be destructive to an ecosystem, as is the case in
many areas where elephant populations have rebounded strongly.96
Elephants can destroy woodlands. While this opens up savannas for grazing
animals, it also reduces habitat for impalas, giraffes, and other browsers, as
well as for baboons.97 Extensive damage to ecosystems could also mean
extensive damage to Kenya's tourist industry. Thus, Kenyans, even with
their stance against the ivory trade, have a vested interest in keeping
elephant populations at manageable levels.
Notwithstanding the CITES ivory ban, by which all five southern
African countries who originally took reservations now abide, these southern
African States continue sustainable management practices such as
"culling." '98 The rationale behind culling is to kill elephants to save
elephants and their habitat. 99  Meat from culling often goes to local
people."° Prior to the appendix I listing, these countries earned millions
94. See Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 21.
95. See id. (arguing that in countries such as Tanzania and Kenya, where over 80% of the people
live off agriculture and human populations are rising at 3-4% each year, few families are willing to
endure hunger so an elephant can live to perhaps help tourist revenues that fail to trickle down to them).
96. See Ricciuti, supra note 6, at 22.
97. Id. at 24. For example, the famous Treetops in Kenya, an animal-viewing hostelry built on
gigantic stilts and once enveloped by forest, now stands conspicuously in a large open area. Id. at 25.
98. Culling is the term for the killing of groups of elephants to keep populations under control.
Elephants are tranquilized from helicopters, and ground crews then shoot them in the brain. Zimbabwe
has culled for 30 years. Id. at 26.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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of dollars in legal trade in elephant products (mostly in ivory) derived from
culling, while still managing increases in populations. " '
B. Prohibition versus Controlled Trade in Ivory
At the 1992 meeting of the Conference, the southern African countries
argued for a compromise that would allow for limited resumption of trade
in meat and skins. Under the terms of the proposed compromise, the
southern African countries agreed to accept the ivory ban until the next
CITES meeting in 1994, thus allowing a reasonable period of time to
implement a trading system that would not encourage any illegal trade in
ivory. °2 These countries later dropped the proposal as a result of intense
pressure from western countries and east African countries who support the
ban. Southern African countries remained bitter, however, and portrayed the
western efforts as a group of developed nations imposing their will on
developing nations.10 3  Those sympathetic to countries who have
successfully increased their elephant populations while maintaining trade see
the continued ivory ban as the "easy way out" for African countries whose
conservation efforts have been less successful: the ban functions as a
substitute for effective law enforcement at the national level, covering up
decades of mismanagement and corruption. 4
Supporters of the prohibition rationale, such as Richard Leakey (former
director of Kenya's wildlife conservation efforts"0 5) and his western
constituents, point to the success of the ivory ban as the predominant reason
for the elephant's recovery in east Africa.' 6 Their main fear is that any
ivory trade will refuel demand and encourage illegal poaching. Staunch
101. For example, Zimbabwe earned more than $13 million from elephant products during the
1980s, and its elephant population increased during that decade. See id.
102. When is Culling the Animal Not Killing the Animal?, supra note 66.
103. Id; see also Child, supra note 43, at 61.
104. See Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 21.
105. Leakey quit in January 1994 amid a cloud of controversy after powerful Kenyan politicians
called for his resignation-their accusations, in what many see as a power struggle for the benefits of
Kenya's tourism proceeds, included racism, corruption, and mismanagement. He recently coordinated
Kenya's successful hard-line, paramilitary stance against poachers that has essentially eradicated poaching
from Kenya's game parks. Without his leadership, and in light of the intensifying conflict between
humans and animals over land, the future of Kenyan wildlife conservation seems quite uncertain. See
Donatella Lorch, Noted Kenya Conservationist Resigning in a Political Storm, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1994,
at L3.
106. See generally Leakey, supra note 78, at 58.
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supporters of this position simply do not believe that there are any adequate
controls in the face of an ivory trade. 0 7  Further, many find culling
abhorrent for moral reasons, based on the inherent intelligence and social
behavior patterns of the elephant.'08
In addition, the tourism industry in Kenya is so productive that many
feel locals in Kenya, unlike those in the southern African countries, do not
need an economic tie to the elephant products trade to encourage the
conservation of elephant populations.' °9 Even Kenyans, however, realize
the need to control these populations, as shown by the fact that Kenyan
wildlife managers have considered the possibility of birth control (such as
a drug similar to RU486) to regulate reproduction and fertility." °
Southern African countries, on the other hand, view the ban on all trade
in elephant products as a waste of natural resources. As elephants continue
to multiply, both their interactions with humans and the ecosystems they
inhabit are placed under stress. Further, as human populations increase and
Africans compete with elephants for scarce resources, locals will begin
lowering elephant populations themselves if incentives for conserving
elephant populations are not developed. Thus, if the elephants are not killed
for ivory, they will be killed for the land they occupy."'
These countries believe, and I agree, that a method of "sustainable
exploitation" based on ivory taken from natural deaths and management
culling would benefit local people without harming the species." 2 The
Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
(CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe serves as a model that utilizes these concepts.
Communities obtain direct revenue from the proceeds of wildlife utilization
in their area; thus rural landowners are given a "stake" in wildlife
conservation." 3 Prior to the ban, ivory sales from culling were essentially
a byproduct of this program; the revenues from sales paid for national
management programs and compensated local communities for property
damage caused by elephants." 4
107. See id. at 89.
108. See Ricciuti, supra note 6, at 28.
109. Revenue from tourism ("viewing use") is ten times the value of potential poached ivory
exports in Kenya. BARBIER ET AL., supra note 86, at 18-19, 110.
110. See Ricciuti, supra note 6, at 29; Leakey, supra note 78, at 59.
Ill. BARBIER ET AL., supra note 86, at 107.
112. See Child, supra note 43, at 60.
113. BARBIER ET AL., supra note 86, at 144. See also Ricciuti, supra note 6, at 34.
114. BARBIER ET AL., supra note 86, at 144.
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The CAMPFIRE program serves two essential goals of effective wildlife
population management: 1) providing necessary revenue for national anti-
poaching activities, and 2) ensuring local cooperation in conservation. Thus,
poaching is combatted both from "above" and from "within." In 1992, these
same communities also had $1.6 million of stockpiled, unsold ivory (at pre-
ban prices), or 6.5 tons of the 27.5 tons in Zimbabwe's national ivory
store." '5 Because of the trade ban, in 1992, a year of severe drought and
hardship, the income of 60,000 members of CAMPFIRE was perhaps only
half of what it would have been if the ivory trade had been legal. ' 6
Zimbabwe's model is not the only success story of elephant
management in Africa. South Africa has presented proposals that would
allow ivory exports from its Kruger National Park (which contains ninety
percent of its elephant population) and confer the related benefits to
locals."7  South Africa has a long tradition of strong and effective anti-
poaching units and a correspondingly stable elephant population. It
presently has its own control and marketing system within its boundaries,
which is similar to those established in 1991 by four other southern States
(Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana, and Malawi). This "cartel" is titled the
South African Centre for Ivory Marketing,"' and serves as the sole ivory
exporting agency of its Members, selling (subject to tight controls) ivory
derived from legally culled elephants. Countries allowing these cartels warn
other CITES Members that expansive international trade "is warranted
because it makes the costly activity of controlling the elephant populations
[and poachers] economically viable."'9'9
115. Child, supra note 43, at 61.
116. Id.
117. See Richard Littell, "Culling" Ivory, Saving Elephants: Relaxing the Trade Ban Can Only
Help Africa's Dwindling Herds, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1992, at C5.
118. Ricciuti, supra note 6, at 30; When Is Culling the Animal not Killing the Animal?, supra note
66, at 10.
119. When is Culling the Animal not Killing the Animal?, supra note 66, at 10.
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V. A SOLUTION: CONTROLLED TRADE THROUGH AN IVORY EXCHANGE
A. The Time is at Hand for the Next Step
The ivory ban has been successful as an interim measure, but it is not
a solution for effective elephant conservation across Africa. Even some
original proponents of the ban suggested that the ivory trade should
eventually move from the embargo model to a controlled management
model-if the elephant were to "get back on its feet" in countries where its
existence was threatened. 2 ° Even now, "Western leaders are reportedly
wavering on whether or not to accept [the southern Africans' argument] that
the best road to conservation is to relax the ban."'' The time has come
for such a move.
In light of the controversy and emotions sparked by the issue, CITES
must take affirmative, concrete steps if such an action is to be considered
"globally legitimate." To reach global legitimacy, the relaxation of the ban
must have the support of the same western countries whose support for the
ivory ban led to its adoption by CITES in 1989. The change in position
must be explained fully to the world community as not just a move towards
a free market, but rather as a move to conserve more effectively elephant
populations while allowing African locals to live better in harmony with
elephants.
B. A Proposed Solution
I propose the following plan for a conservation-minded, strictly
regulated reopening of the ivory trade: an international "ivory exchange,"
administered by the CITES administration, with a central auction center in
Switzerland. This location would be ideal for two reasons. First, the
activities of the Exchange would fall under the close scrutiny of the
120. Glennon, supra note 36, at 39. In 1989 Richard Leakey suggested that it would take five
to ten years for elephant populations to reach fairly stable numbers. Id. at 39. That time has evidently
been shortened by the success of the ban, and, to an even greater extent, by strong anti-poaching
enforcement efforts in countries such as Kenya. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
121. When is Culling the Animal not Killing the Animal?, supra note 66, at 10. After the last
CITES conference in November 1994, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, however, the ban remained in effect.
See Maria Cone, Conflict Marks Endangered Species Treaty, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1994, at 1. Despite
some evidence of western sympathy to the southern Africans' pleadings to lift the ban, trade ban interests
prevailed. Id.
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Secretariat. Second, the CITES administrative offices can put in place both
price ceilings and floors to control demand. Ivory producers and consumers
would negotiate for pricing recommendations to be made to the Secretariat.
Initially, the African elephant needs to be downlisted from appendix I
to the status of appendix II "plus."'1 22  This move would hardly be
antithetical to the spirit of the CITES listing process. CITES listing and
population levels are to be based on a particular species' ecological role in
the ecosystems in which it is found; 123 at this point, the high densities of
elephants affect ecosystems in negative ways. Under the appendix II "plus"
system proposed here, if a producer State wishes to participate in the
Exchange, it must set quotas and submit them to the Exchange. Further, all
participating States must agree to leave their quotas subject to verification
and audit, at the request of other parties. Since the treatment of the African
elephant has been closely scrutinized by numerous governments and wildlife
conservation groups across the globe, these entities will not hesitate to spend
the time and money to take advantage of this auditing provision when a
quota put forth by a producing State seems suspiciously high. Thus, one of
the reasons for the failure of the IEQS-abuse of the quota system by
producers-would be substantially eliminated.
The new system should retain the requirement of export permits, with
the provision that such a permit must accompany every ivory shipment to
the Exchange. Thus, if a shipment of ivory leaves a producer State, it must
be accompanied by an export permit and go directly to the Exchange.
A marking system should be initiated for all ivory crossing international
borders. Government clearing houses can be strategically located near
refuges and parks in producer countries. Each tusk will be marked in some
fashion to identify its origin and to protect against flow of illegal ivory in
trade. "It is now possible not only to identify ivory by species of origin, but
also to mark ivory tusks so that parts of lawfully taken tusks are
subsequently identifiable-easily and inexpensively."' 24 A few methods
have proved viable in the past and may be workable in the future, including
one in which each tusk is marked with an indelible hologram, and a sample
122. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
123. FAVRE, supra note 2, at 33.
124. Glennon, supra note 36, at 39.
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of the same tusk is kept for isotropic analysis.'25 Any tusk reaching a
point of import can be checked for an isotropic "match."
As mentioned, the gaping hole left by CITES' lack of a proper
definition for "derivative of' and "readily recognizable part" of a species,
which was often unscrupulously and illegally "filled" by entrep6t
intermediary countries with a few quick hacks at a piece of raw ivory, must
be closed with clear definitions. Distinguishing between raw ivory and the
broad category of worked ivory must end; only those ivory items that have
obviously been in the flow of trade for years, or are obviously no longer
"readily recognizable" as coming from the elephant, should be allowed to
escape the CITES' regulations. The Convention needs to look no further
than the text of CITES for a solution, as it provides for the listing of
"specified parts and derivatives" of listed animals.' 26 The Parties should
pass the following resolution, which can be enforced by the Exchange:
worked ivory should be on a "parts and derivatives" list, and only certain
listed exceptions will be exempt. For example, piano keys and intricately
carved works of art such as miniature figurines could be among the articles
listed as exempt from the scrutiny of CITES. These two measures, the
marking system and the parts and derivative listing, would greatly undercut
entrep6ts and the black market, along with the incentives to poachers.
The Exchange itself could be set up as follows. To be a Member,
consumer countries must sign exclusive agreements to purchase all ivory
through the Exchange,'27 while suppliers will be strictly limited to those
government entities following the quota system outlined in the appendix II
"plus" listing process.'28 The effectiveness of a producer State's anti-
poaching forces will also be scrutinized. For example, producers found to
be abusing the quota system, perhaps after another party has audited their
elephant population documentation, will be suspended or, if the abuse is
serious enough, banned from the Exchange. Further, to even become
125. See "'Culling" Ivory, Saving Elephants, supra note 117, at C5; see also Clues in DNA and
Isotopes Help Identify Ivory Origin, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1990, at C4 (describing origins of the methods
to identify ivory by DNA or certain isotopes).
126. CITES, supra note 8, art. I(b)(3), T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1091, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
127. Thus, the new system would have the effect of requiring both import and export permits, as
countries looking to purchase ivory from the Exchange would have inherently allowed such imports.
128. This agreement structure is based on a version of an ivory exchange suggested by Barbier.
See BARBIER ET AL., supra note 86, at 125-26.
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Members of the Exchange, producers' applications will be evaluated on the
success of their sustainable management programs.
In implementing the Exchange, Parties should integrate this extensive
plan into the very text of CITES. This should be done through an
amendment, as opposed to a non-binding resolution (i.e., a
"recommendation" of the Conference of the Parties). Resolutions often are
unsuccessful since countries fail to abide by their terms (the failed IEQS1 29
was part of such a resolution). Article XVII allows for amending the text
of CITES. Upon written request of one-third of the Parties, the Secretariat
shall call a special Conference of the Parties; an amendment will be adopted
with a two-thirds vote of acceptance of the Parties. 30 If the Ivory
Exchange proposal meets these requirements,1 31 the Exchange will become
article XXVI of CITES.
The Conference should also pass a resolution encouraging domestic
systems similar to that seen in Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE program. To get
the ivory needed for the Exchange, governments should go to their local
citizens. For example, governments can purchase from local communities
culling rights and "retrieval" rights for elephants dying of natural causes in
their area. This practice will encourage local communities to refrain not
only from poaching, but will also give them the incentive to police, along
with government anti-poaching units, against poachers from other areas.
Finally, a premium or tax on every sale at the Exchange will funnel
money into a CITES fund. Part of this money will go to producing States
to help finance the purchasing of manpower and firepower to combat
poachers, as well as to fund research geared toward developing improved
strategies to fight illegal trading and poaching. The remainder of the money
derived from this tax will go into a general CITES fund for international
elephant conservation purposes. The fund could be used for auditing the
legitimacy of producer States' quotas, or even for immediate monetary aid
to finance increased enforcement troops in countries having trouble with
poachers at particular times.
129. See FAVRE, supra note 2, at 127.
130. CITES, supra note 8, art. XVII(l), T.I.A.S. No. 8249, at 1114, 993 U.N.T.S. at 256.
13 1. Granted, this would be no small feat. Such a move would need much more political support
than the proponents of a controlled ivory trade currently have. Further, history suggests that voting the
proposal into the text of CITES would be difficult-only two such proposed amendments have been
attempted, and only one became legally effective. See FAVRE, supra note 2, at 315.
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Granted, lifting the ivory ban and implementing such a plan would
hardly be free from criticism or possible problems. The corruption of
customs officials, or even anti-poaching units, has been and always will be
a concern, especially in times of political unrest. The great majority of the
profits made by producer States from the Exchange should go toward
elephant conservation (especially anti-poaching enforcement). While CITES
can do little to control the flow of money brought back from the Exchange,
it can scrutinize another, more important "bottom line"-the stability of
elephant populations within producer States belonging to the Exchange. The
threat of expulsion from the Exchange for abusing the quota system, and
thus losing the business of consumer countries who have signed exclusive
agreements to purchase from the Exchange, may be enough to cause
producing States to take elephant conservation seriously.
Another concern is that lifting the ban may cause wildlife conservation
groups opposed to the ivory trade to halt their financial support of
conservation efforts in producer States. Even if many groups stopped giving
support, which in itself seems antithetical to wildlife conservation, that
revenue will be replaced by profits from the Exchange. Further, if the
repeal of the ban is framed by its proponents as a long-term conservation
solution to a situation growing continually more unstable as elephants and
humans compete to survive, then perhaps these supporters will take a closer
look at the positive possibilities.
Conversely, some may argue that if this is a step toward the market,
why not go all the way? In other words, there might be a "free rider"
problem in this system that could be solved by moving to an even freer
market for ivory. While a local African community might gain from a
culling right or "retrieval" right given to the government, the money derived
from that one elephant is dispersed between the Members of the community.
A poacher in the black market, on the other hand, gains the value of the
whole elephant. Thus, some may suggest placing ownership rights to
elephants in individuals to protect against the development of a black
market.
Such a system is, however, highly impractical. The elephant has an
incredible habitat range. An individual would have a difficult time keeping
track of his or her elephants. Efforts to "ranch" probably would be fruitless
due to the elephant's size and intelligence, not to mention the formidable
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cost of attempting to fence in a group of elephants.'32  Further,
maintaining small groups would keep elephants from dispersing and might
lead to the negative effects of inbreeding.'
In terms of preventing poaching, a private elephant owner would require
numerous employees at his disposal to police the poaching of elephants.
The risk of "free riding" is also present in this situation, as those paid by the
owner to protect the elephants may be tempted by the thought of gaining
more profit for themselves by cooperating with poachers.
Local communities, however, could simply conserve those elephant
populations that happen to be within their area at particular times, rather
than making fruitless attempts at "tracking." While establishing a "stake"
in conservation, the revenue to the community would be in addition to, not
in lieu of, the income derived predominantly from agricultural pursuits. In
dire times such as drought, it will be something to fall back on. Finally,
economists and free market environmentalists, often the proponents of
placing environmental property rights in individuals, have given rave
reviews to systems such as CAMPFIRE."3
VI. CONCLUSION
The ivory ban has served its purpose. However, it is no longer the only,
or the best, plan to save the elephant in the long run. A strictly controlled
ivory trade will better serve the people of Africa by giving them a stake in
conservation and allowing citizens in the local African communities to live
in greater harmony with the African elephants. In the future, as both
elephant and human populations grow in Africa, the battle between the two
species for scarce resources will intensify. Under subsistence conditions, an
environmental ethic easily gives way to the desire to survive. Giving ivory-
producing countries and their citizens an economic incentive to conserve the
African elephant will ensure the continued survival of both Africa's people
and its elephants.
132. Fencing in elephants can also lead to devastating effects for the land that is enclosed, as
shown by elephant populations that have stripped the landscape in Kenya's fenced refuges. See Ricciuti,
supra note 6, at 24-26.
133. Id. at 26.
134. See Terry L. Anderson, Zimbabwe Makes Living With Wildlife Pay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25,
1991, at A14 (praising the effectiveness of CAMPFIRE's conservation efforts, while noting that it
increases household incomes); BARBIER ET AL., supra note 86, at 143-46.
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